Norbert-Jan Nuij
Amsterdam, May 7, 1945: a liberation day marked by war violence, with the shooting on and around Dam Square as the last major bloodbath on Dutch soil. Because an army of professional and amateur photographers was ready to capture the entry of the first Allied liberators, this event is likely the most photographed tragedy of the Second World War in the Netherlands. Yet the more than one hundred known photos contribute little to answering the critical question of how this could happen, just two days after the German capitulation. Most of the images were taken either before the shooting began or after it ended, with the transport of wounded individuals being particularly well-documented.
Reason
Contemporary newspaper reports and eyewitness accounts (as well as accounts long after 1945) often cite drunken and vengeful German soldiers as the cause, unexpectedly opening fire on the celebrating crowd. The most common theory, however – which was already suggested in various newspapers at the time – is that the cause was related to the arrest and disarmament of German soldiers on the street by the Netherlands Interior Forces (BS, Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten), during which a German soldier was allegedly shot.
The famous dutch historian Lou de Jong, specialised in the Netherlands in WWII, later introduced a new possible explanation: the public abuse of so-called Kraut girls on a cart in Dam Square. However, it remains unclear why De Jong considered the statement from witness Karel Marquenie, made in 1968, a serious possibility, given that it is not mentioned in any other witness account or report regarding May 7.
The story of drunken German Kriegsmarine soldiers in De Groote Club is also absent from any reports by the involved BS commanders (such as Overhoff and Trampusch). Some BS reports mention the arrests of German soldiers and the takeover of the ‘Geldkantoor’/ money exchange office as potential causes, but without specifying whether these actions fell within the BS’s mandate.
In recent years, it has been increasingly pointed out that the BS was not authorized to patrol the streets armed, let alone disarm German troops. On paper, only the British-Canadian 21st Army Group, commanded by Field Marshal Montgomery – whom the German Wehrmacht in the Netherlands, North-West Germany, and Denmark had surrendered to at Lüneburg on May 4 – was authorized to carry out such actions.
Capitulation
The situation in West Netherlands and Amsterdam was, in practice, more complex than it may seem on paper or in hindsight. Although the unconditional surrender of all German troops in the Netherlands came into effect at 8:00 AM on May 5, a 120,000-strong armed force still remained in Festung Holland. The first Allied troops would not enter until May 7. The main points of the surrender orders for the Netherlands were established in Wageningen at Hotel De Wereld, but additional discussions between the Canadian and German military leadership continued on May 6. While awaiting the arrival of the Allies, both the German troops and the Interior Forces (BS) were instructed to remain in place until further notice. In Amsterdam, a few thousand armed Germans and a BS force (officially 5,000 men) with over 2,000 weapons created a powder keg. Resentment and feelings of revenge were sparks that could set the city ablaze.
According to newspaper Trouw, the situation in Amsterdam on May 5 was unclear and ambiguous. At 8:00 AM, a small German unit held a surrender ceremony, during which soldiers lowered their rifles and removed the ammunition from their magazines. Flags appeared everywhere, but an hour and a half later, shots were fired at the gathered crowd from the SS building, resulting in one death. The German military police (Feldgendarmerie) detained the perpetrators. That evening, a serious shooting incident occurred on Valkenburgerstraat following a raid by the Grüne Polizei on a BS post: four resistance fighters were killed, along with possibly eight Germans. The next day, according to a diary entry by Gerardus Jacobus Buijs, the Grüne Polizei was still “very active, provocatively racing through the crowded streets, with machine guns aimed at the crowds, such as on Kalverstraat and Nieuwendijk.”
The streets showed an occupying force determined to maintain order to the very end, even if it meant using force. For the population, the continued armed German presence dampened the joy of liberation; for the long-suffering resistance, it was even harder to bear that the occupier remained in control on the streets even after the surrender.
Tension
In the final months of the war, the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police) and police units of the Ordnungspolizei (Grüne Polizei) relentlessly pursued the growing resistance movement. With the help and armament of the Allies, the BS (Interior Forces) was able to carry out more attacks and acts of sabotage, but at a high cost. In Amsterdam, between January and April 1945, at least 130 civilians, hostages, and resistance members were executed as reprisals, and many others were arrested.
With the increasing German repression and a rapidly growing BS, maintaining strict secrecy became even more difficult than before. This raised the risk of capture, but also the chance of betrayal and forced confessions. The great loss of comrades, the exhausting tension of living in hiding, and the harsh winter of hunger had worn down the underground fighters. The prospect of victory, of stepping out of the shadows and delivering the final blow to the occupier during the hour of liberation, of capturing traitors and Nazi war criminals, had kept them going.
Consultation between BS Commander Overhoff and Ortskommandant Schröder
On May 7, the long-awaited arrival of the Canadians (ultimately, on this day, only a small British reconnaissance unit of the English 49th ‘Polar Bears’ division reached the capital.) signaled the Amsterdam BS to take action. The takeover of Central Station at 11:00 AM was not initiated independently, as with Operation Three Castles, but by order from higher up. It appears that discussions between the Amsterdam BS leadership and Ortskommandant/garrison commander H.A.O. (Hans) Schröder also played a role in the decision to step out into the open. It is certain that, in late April, a meeting took place in Amsterdam between Schröder and Overhoff regarding a ceasefire with the resistance. [1] Although no concrete agreements were made, the Oberstleutnant, who was favorably known among parts of Amsterdam’s elite, seemed willing to organize the impending transfer of power in cooperation with the BS.
In post-war tributes, Schröder was praised for his stance – sometimes at odds with Nazi policy – and his commitment to the city. For this, he was reportedly summoned several times, being told that he appeared to be more Amsterdammer than German. [2]
On May 6, another meeting was held in which, according to Overhoff, it was agreed that “the Germans would remain consigned,” but that “unarmed Germans, who were to serve in the city, would remain unhindered.” [3]
At the local level, there was frequent consultation between the German authorities and the BS. It seems that, during the chaotic liberation days, the internal communication lines between the two sides often struggled to keep up with the developments, causing confusion about the interpretation of the capitulation conditions, such as the carrying of weapons or the disarmament of the occupying forces. Moreover, both the BS and the Germans were uncertain whether all units would follow the orders and instructions from above. The BS was a loose coalition where the overarching authority of commanders like Overhoff was formally recognized but often effectively lay with the leaders of the original resistance groups. Within the BS and the German military leadership, there was doubt whether SS or other units would simply comply with the capitulation.
In Amsterdam, these factors tragically came together on May 7. Escalation followed action and reaction. For the German soldiers, the BS’s attempts to disarm them were unacceptable. Conversely, for some BS units, it was intolerable that armed SS men were still on the streets. [4]
SS
After the final skirmishes at Central Station, reports emerged that SS soldiers had alternately fired on the BS and on Germans at Damrak street, possibly to provoke further fighting. Wehrmacht soldiers, in the last phase of the battle, were even said to have fought alongside the SS against each other. The BS commander responsible at Central Station, Reserve Captain Berckenhoff, spoke afterwards with Hauptmann Bergmann (Feldgendarmerie) about the course of the fighting. The chief of the German military police asked him how many German prisoners he had taken: “Two Wehrmacht and four SS,” Berckenhoff replied. “SS doesn’t count, so two prisoners,” Bergmann said. Berckenhoff then asked if he should not take the SS men with him. “Hang them, on my behalf,” Bergmann replied, to which Berckenhoff responded, “I can’t guarantee I won’t actually do that.” “Well, let them come,” Bergmann said. Berckenhoff continued, “The four SS men were then brought forward and literally kicked away by the German…” [5]
Of course, it was also convenient for Bergmann (and the BS) that the SS or the ‘verdammte/damned Kriegsmarine’ (Bergmann) were blamed, but it also shows that it is too simplistic to place the responsibility for the completely out-of-control situation solely on the BS.
Although Overhoff and Schröder’s chief of military police, Hauptmann Bergmann, had restored order and avoided a greater catastrophe with their actions, they could not prevent many casualties from occurring. How many exactly?
Casualties
After extensive research, the Stichting Memorial has traced 32 victims (including two BS members) who died as a result of the shooting on and around Dam Square. In his standard work on the Netherlands during World War II, historian Lou de Jong mentions “twenty-two dead and nearly sixty seriously injured, some of whom (the exact number is unknown) later died.” According to him, “as far as is known,” there were no casualties among the Germans or BS members. [6] This figure of 22 civilian deaths has since been widely accepted and became the ‘official’ death toll, but what was this number based on?
At the time, newspapers reported varying numbers of casualties, and it remains unclear whether these figures referred only to civilian victims, which could be a possible explanation. Notably, the loss figures in Het Parool were much higher.
19 dead, 117 injured (De Volkskrant, 8 May 1945)
19 dead, 117 injured (Vrij Nederland, 9 May 1945)
20 dead, 50 seriously injured, 100 lightly injured (De Waarheid, 8 May 1945)
22 dead, 93 seriously injured (Ons Noorden, 12 May 1945)
23 dead, 93 injured (Amsterdamsch Dagblad, 8 May 1945)
40 dead, 200 injured (Het Parool, 9 May 1945) [plus 50 fallen German soldiers and 25 injured]
According to a report from the Canadian military authorities (dated 24 May 1945, written by Lieutenant Colonel M.S. Oxley), there was no police report on the incident; only a list with detailed data of 22 civilian fatalities. The report also mentions 125 injured (and possibly 11 dead Germans). However, this victim list (originally included as ‘Appendix A’) was missing from the archived documents and is still missing. This is unfortunate, as if De Jong based his figure on this list, the difference between his findings and those of Stichting Memorial (which found 26 victims who died on May 7 – with an additional four deaths in the following two days, one on May 18, and another on June 22) would be very small. This Appendix A could have helped explain the two-death discrepancy. [7]
Since there were multiple shootings on May 7, it had to be established whether the victims were actually casualties of the events on Dam Square. Remarkably, as has been shown, there were no civilian fatalities during the gunfights behind the Palace (around Nieuwezijds Voorburgwal/Paleisstraat/Raadhuisstraat) or later at Central Station. However, there were a number of German soldiers and two BS members killed at Central Station, who are commemorated with plaques at the station (W.H. Zeeman) and at the Victoria Hotel (Jan de Jongh). Although the shooting at Central Station stemmed from the chaotic firefight around Dam Square, it was a more organized, military confrontation.
In Amsterdam-Noord, BS member Koopmans was fatally shot in the abdomen by a Sten gun that accidentally discharged. He died at 2:30 p.m. in the Binnengasthuis hospital. During several gunfights on Amstelveenseweg (near Vondelpark), five BS members ultimately lost their lives (four on May 7 and one on June 26). Finally, a passerby was killed in a brief shootout around 6:30 p.m. at Weteringschans. In total, 33 Dutch casualties occurred in Amsterdam on May 7 (26 dead on Dam Square and seven at other locations – excluding the unfortunate Koopmans). When adding the seven victims who later died, the total reaches 40 fatalities.
Injuries
The number of injured varies, with estimates ranging from 50 to 93 seriously wounded and a total of 117 to 200 injured. In a BS report, it is stated that by 9:15 p.m. at the nearest hospital, the Binnengasthuis (on Grimburgwal), 90 people had been treated; 44 were admitted, and 17 died. By the following morning at 10:00 a.m., the situation was as follows: 52 patients remained hospitalized, and 48 had been discharged after outpatient treatment. These figures align closely with the original Wachtrapport-Binnengasthuis, which recorded all incoming patients by name, their initial diagnosis, and cause of injury. For May 7, it lists 93 cases, including 50 with gunshot wounds. [8]
It appears that estimates of around 50 seriously injured individuals best reflect the reality. The number of lightly wounded is likely to have been higher than 50, as many would have received first aid at the Nieuwe Kerk and other first aid stations or gone directly home after treatment.
German casualties
At least two German soldiers were clearly killed in the shooting on and around Dam Square, as they were photographed. One Grüne Polizist was killed on the Dam connection road between the Damrak and Rokin, and the other is visible in a photo, lying next to a German truck on the Raadhuisstraat side of the Geldkantoor/ money exchange office (now a supermarket/ W Amsterdam Hotel).
From newspaper reports, it can be inferred that several Germans were killed in the fighting around Dam Square – and one near Vondelpark. Only Het Parool (and the Three Castles memorial publication) mentions 50 German dead, but this seems to be an exaggeration. The Germans had their own field hospitals for the wounded – including the naval complex at Kattenburg and a Luftwaffe hospital in a wing of the Wilhelmina Gasthuis (during 1940–45: Wester Gasthuis). With such a high death toll, more injured Germans would likely have been brought to the Binnengasthuis in the chaos, given the large number of medical personnel present. However, only four wounded Germans are mentioned in the hospital reports: two dying and two injured. Unlike the significant German losses at Central Station, no German death toll is reported in any of the known BS (Dutch Resistance) documents concerning Dam Square. According to the report from the responsible BS commander at the Central Station, F.P. Berckenhoff, the German losses there (as per their own account) were: 1 officer and 9 men from the Ordnungspolizei, 8 from the Wehrmacht, and 4 SS members [9]
His superior in the city center, P. van der Reijden, mentioned a slightly higher number of 23 in reports from 1951 and 1952. It is unclear if this refers only to those killed; he also noted that, by May 11, 1945, 18 German soldiers had been buried at the Ooster-begraafplaats/cementary. [10]
After combining data from the German War Cemetery at Ysselsteyn and the Deutsche Dienststelle (WASt) in Berlin, 17 German soldiers were traced who may have died as a result of the May 7th shooting incidents in Amsterdam. These 17 men were all later reburied at Ysselsteyn, in sections CT III (64, 65, 66, 68, 72, 73, 74, 75), CT V (101, 102, 104, 105, 106, and 125), and CX I (1, 2, 3). Among these German casualties, five were members of the SS-Polizei Regiment 3, part of the Ordnungspolizei (also known as the Grüne Polizei); one was associated with the Wehrmacht Command in Amsterdam, and one held the rank of officer (Hauptmann). At most, two were possibly linked to the Kriegsmarine.
Therefore, the total number of deaths from the shooting on and around Dam Square can be established as at least 34, and for all of Amsterdam, at least 42 (including three Germans) – with a potential additional 20 or so (German) casualties.
The Question of Guilt
The lack of an investigation into the cause of such a severe shooting incident and the question of who was to blame remains mysterious. Overhoff’s deputy, Petrus van der Reijden, later stated that he had noticed no investigation taking place. Overhoff and some other resistance members have indicated that the Canadian intelligence service, the Field Security, was requesting information – a claim supported by some existing English translations of BS reports about the shooting. However, no public or accessible report was produced, either about the shooting(s) on May 7 or about any legal proceedings involving those involved. To date, the German occupation of the Groote Club – where naval personnel and other German soldiers were housed after the shooting – was terminated on May 9 when they were removed in Canadian trucks. They were likely first taken to a prisoner camp in the Amsterdam Ford harbor, and from there transported via IJmuiden to northern Germany.
Canadian Priorities
The Canadian priority was to quickly and orderly transport the German occupying forces to prisoner camps in northern Germany and to facilitate the swift return of Canadian troops to Canada; it was not focused on a shooting incident in which no Canadians were involved. After the liberation, the Dutch government was primarily concerned with restoring the pre-war legal order, ensuring the supply of basic necessities, and arresting collaborators. In the difficult aftermath of the war, the tragedy at Dam Square was left to rest, as the painful realization that the cause and question of guilt were more complex than desirable likely played a role.
After May 1945, a period of reconstruction followed, with a focus on the future. Among resistance circles, there was also disappointment over the swift return of the old political dynamics and divisions. Painful memories of the war were mostly shared privately or taken to the grave.
* This article is an update and translation of the chapter (in Dutch) ‘Balans van een bloedbad’ (p. 184-192) from Drama op de Dam – 7 mei 1945 (Nuij, Van Santen 2017). Specifically, the texts referring to notes 1, 3, 4, 8, and 10, as well as notes 4 and 10 themselves.
[1] Oorlogsherinneringen (War Memories) van C.F. Overhoff, Netherlands Institute for Military History (NIMH), Bevrijding, 447, inv. 83, p. 210-211 and NIOD, 251a, Stichting LO-LKP, inv. 214 deel 1, seq. nrs. 4-5.
[2] Nationaal Archief, Ordedienst/BS, 2.13.137, inv. nr. 258.
[3] Oorlogsherinneringen van C.F. Overhoff, NIMH, Bevrijding, 447, inv. 83, p. 220-221. [4] How Overhoff himself saw it more or less can be seen from his Oorlogsherinneringen/War Memories, when he writes about the weapons ban after the arrival of the Canadians: “in the meantime, the arrest of NSB (Dutch fascist/Nazi political organization red.) members etc. had started […] and of course the BS was armed. This was in conflict with a general proclamation by the commanding officer Lt. Gen. Ch. Foulkes, who forbade any carrying of weapons. […] So they wanted total disarmament, to which I made every objection that could be made. As is always the case with these things, this eventually sorted itself out, but only after great effort.[…] I need not say that orders can be given to underground forces, but that compliance under circumstances such as existed is another matter and that little came of this fine arrangement, while the Canadian side gradually became accustomed to us and gained more appreciation, which meant that the implementation was not adhered to.”
Oorlogsherinneringen/War memories by C.F. Overhoff, p. 235.
[5] National Archives, 2.13.137, inv. no. 4726.
[6] L. De Jong, Het Koninkrijk in WW2 (1969-1994), part 10b, second half, p. 1423.
[7] National Archives, 2.13.208, inv. no. 2745.
[8] Coll. Verzetsmuseum, object no. 19690.
[9] National Archives, 2.13.137, inv. no. 4726.
[10] NIOD, 249-1110. According to data from the War Graves Foundation, there were not 18 but 19. In one report, about all German soldiers buried at the Nieuwe Ooster (Amsterdam), 19 names are listed ‘died on 07.05.45 on Damrak’, but four of them demonstrably died before 7 May. In addition, some names are listed incorrectly and there is a duplication. In the end, 16 remained, as can also be read in the book Drama op de Dam, 7 mei 1945. In 2023, another possible name was added, the obergefreiter Heinrich Diedrichs, who died in Amsterdam on 1 June (CT V, 125, Ysselstyn German War Cementary).